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Abstract
First, I review the context for the need of new deliberative models, specifically agonistic deliberative
models, for public discourse and for use in training students for public discourse. I then highlight five
specific points that I trouble and enrich, principally through the work of Giroux, Arendt, Biesta, and
Duarte. While I agree that there is great value in Lo’s description of the agonistic deliberative model, I
advocate for what Biesta would call a weaker model of deliberation, one that sets the conditions for
transformative education but one that does not act as an instrument for it.
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I

n a time and place where public dialogue is both waning
yet critically important for the future of the democratic
project, Lo has done an excellent job of explicating the
context for the need of new deliberative models, specifically
agonistic deliberative models, for public discourse and for use in
training students for public discourse. The debate on how citizens
ought to engage in democratic discourse in a pluralistic society is
nuanced, and for this reason, it is salient to consider at least
briefly the historical background of democratic discourse that
leads us to our current concern. Lo positioned her argument in
the context of the deliberative models of democratic discussion
developed principally by German philosopher Jürgen Habermas,
whose notion of deliberative democracy signaled a significant
shift in contemporary discussion of political debate (Lubenow,
2012, p. 58). Habermas was interested in what Cohen (1997) called
“collective decisions of the members of a society” but then further
considered precisely what it takes for a decision to be collective
(p. 407).
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Habermas’s work moved contemporary debates away
from traditional democratic discourse focusing on aggregative,
or procedural, democracy to a form of discourse that is not
exclusively procedural, one which he referred to as deliberative
democracy (Cohen, 1997, p. 411–412). Rather than relying on
procedural solutions to conflict, Habermas advocated for what
Cohen (1997) called “political justification,” or “free public reasoning among equals” (p. 412). The desired outcome of this public
reasoning or deliberation is that once a decision has been made in
deliberation, participants “are prepared to cooperate in accordance
with the results of such discussion, treating those results as
authoritative” (Cohen, 1997, p. 413).
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It was at this point that Lo posited yet another pivot, this time
away from this deliberative model to that of an agonistic one. The
author opened by discussing the very conflicts that arise from
pluralistic democracy that I mentioned earlier, and suggested that
not only is this pluralism inherently divisive but conflict is in fact
productive in a pluralistic society. Lo went on, through an analysis
of Habermas, Rawls, Arendt, and Schmitt, to contrast the Habermasian deliberative model with the agonistic one. Lo elucidated
the agonistic model through an analysis of the work of Arendt and
Schmitt; Lo argued that both embrace unresolved conflict in such a
way as to suggest this agonistic deliberative approach. Lo then
described in greater detail this agonistic model, its benefits and
conditions, and then ended with two useful concreate examples.
I hope with my paper to extend the dialogue of this critically
important work through highlighting a few specific points that I
trouble and enrich, principally through the work of Giroux (2011),
Arendt (1959), Biesta (2014), and Duarte (2001). I suggest five
principle areas worth troubling for further exploration. I aim to
conclude that a conceptualization of agonistic deliberation would
benefit from a weak, noninstrumentalist approach, which I
develop further in this paper.
While I agree that there is great value in Lo’s description of the
agonistic deliberative model, I advocate for a weaker model of
deliberation, based on Biesta’s notion of weak education, a model
that sets the conditions for transformative education but one that
does not act as an instrument for it. To that end, I have highlighted
areas that I explore to the end of developing a richer dialogue
around the notion of agonism. First, I provide a deeper analysis of
how emotion is treated in the article; then I explore what is meant
by public and political in this context, followed by an exploration of
transformation, the conditions for transformation, and the
potential for oppression in agonism.

Emotion
Lo (2017) stated, “Strong emotive structures . . . may be at the root of
conflicts,” and further that these emotions have significant value in
democratic discourse (p. 5). I wonder, however, if we might explore
emotion a bit further and tease out two pieces that deserve further
consideration. First, consider the relationship between emotion,
rationality, and legitimacy. Lo (2017) wrote, “Students may feel like
strangers are only willing to listen and talk about the issues that are
rational, rather than to listen to and validate their feelings on difficult
issues that are incommensurable with societal norms” (p. 5). My
concern here is that it could be read that those with marginal
viewpoints are not rational; rather, they are emotional. While it is
true that “emotional” doesn’t have to be read as “irrational,” it is a
critical point that the emotions of the marginal do not need validation, as they are already valid. The notion alludes to Delpit’s (2006)
description of a “paternalism” that suggests that certain marginal
groups must “be given voice” (p. 19). Giroux (2011) further suggested
that within this paternalism we favor only “meanings, abilities,
language forms, and tastes that are directly or indirectly defined by
dominant groups as socially legitimate” (p. 22).
While I agree with the author that emotion should not be
quelled in the classroom, I suggest a cautionary note: Rather than
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simply conceptualizing emotional response as an outlet for
marginal groups, we might also allow for the potentiality that
listening to the Other might actually teach us something tangible
from these emotional responses. As Shapiro (2006) pointed out in
Loosing Heart: The Moral and Spiritual Miseducation of America’s
Children, “We must develop the capacity for compassionate
attentiveness to the words of the other” (p. 161). This is important
because while Shapiro clearly pointed out that “people’s identification with a particular point of view is, first, a matter of our emotional connections to it,” what ultimately mattered to him was an
attentiveness to the words of the Other (p. 161). For this reason, it
seems prudent to reiterate that emotion is valuable; it ought not be
seen as replacing the need for listening to the words of those who
are marginalized (p. 161).
The second concern in relation to emotion involves its
usefulness; while I agree with Lo (2017) in her validation of
emotion as both acceptable in discourse and potentially fruitful, it
is the insinuation that emotion might be fashioned as instrumentalist that seems problematic. Certainly to allow space for the
honest and organic expression of emotion is legitimate, but then
“‘to [mobilize] those passions towards the promotion of democratic designs’” seems a bit like using emotion as a means to an end,
thus instrumentalizing a basic aspect of the human condition
(Mouffe, cited in Lo, 2017, p. 6). In addition to the verb mobilize,
twice the author used the word channel in reference to emotional
conflict. Once Lo suggested to “channel that conflict positively, as
opposed to minimizing or eliminating the conflict rationally,” and
the second mention of the word was when the author suggested
channeling these conflicts for productive ends (pp. 5–6). I am left
worrying that this approach risks dissolving “theory into utility”
(Giroux, 2011, p. 33). Indeed, even as Lo laid out two agonistic
strategies at the end, it seems this focus on “technique” might
further serve to objectify and devalue the emotional response
themselves (Giroux, 2011, p. 20). A further concern related to this
instrumentalism is taken up in the following section, where I
consider the implications of what these instruments might be
designed to accomplish.

The Public, the Private, and the Political
Lo (2017) was clearly concerned with a waning of the public sphere
of dialogue (p. 3). The withdrawal from the public world into
the private is cause for concern, and Lo made an impactful point
here. Lo (2017), quoting Rawls, noted that public spaces in this sense
are places where individuals can “practice public reason,” and where
“they create the political ‘from shared fundamental ideas implicit in
the public political culture’” (p. 4). Two distinct issues come to mind
at this point. First, students are becoming “isolated in an increasingly
individualized world or socialized into their own segregated
communities” (Lo, 2017, p. 8). This segregation takes the form of
communities of faith, thought, and action. Further, Lo (2017) made a
second point that this manifests in a rise in the “privatization of
schools, universities, and political processes,” making this need to
reclaim public spaces “for the political” of critical importance (p. 8).
While there is much in these notions that are of critical
importance, it is vital to point out that the public and the political
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are terms that might need further examination. First, while Lo
developed understanding of the political and the public from the
work of Arendt, the article did not make mention that Arendt
(1959), in “Reflections on Little Rock,” made a stark statement
about children and the political and public spheres:
The conflict between a segregated home and a desegregated school,
between family prejudice and school demands, abolishes at one stroke
both the teachers’ and the parents’ authority, replacing it with the rule
of public opinion among children who have neither the ability nor
the right to establish a public opinion of their own (p. 56)

Contextually, it is important to note that Arendt here was speaking
specifically of the American civil rights movement school integration, and she believed rather strongly that children of color in this
instance were being used as political pawns when they had no
business being in the public or political forum. This raises an
important query: Are public schools really public forums at all, or
are they are in fact only simulations of the public world? If the latter
is true, should they be treated as such and not approached in quite
the political fashion that one might a public space?
To be clear, I am not arguing that education is not political or
even that there is nothing political that happens in the classroom.
Clearly this is not true; from curricular biases, gerrymandered
districts, hidden curricula, and systemic racism, it is demonstrably
true that schooling is already intensely politicized. However, if we
return to Arendt’s (1959) notion of vita activa, there might be a
distinction to be made between the political aspects of school and
having students “do” politics. The active doing of politics is, for
Arendt, a public and specifically adult endeavor.
But I do think that there is something to be said for the
simulation of the public, and the examples that Lo provided might
well serve as this type of simulation, but with a caveat: The simulation is not a place to act, but to practice acting, and then reflect
critically on this action. In the words of Duarte (2001), referencing
Arendt, “‘thinking is a solitary, apolitical endeavor that happens
apart from political affairs of everyday life’” (p. 210). If democratic
education is to flourish, surely allowing students space to think
becomes a cornerstone of practice, especially following an agonistic simulation. Otherwise, one cannot move from acting (or
simulating an act) to thinking on that act in order to enrich and
develop meaning.
With that in mind, we come now to a critical delineation
between the personal space and the public life in the classroom. If,
as Duarte (2001) stated, “thinking, properly speaking, cannot
occur when one is ‘in the world,”’ we ought not force students to
make public utterances on their thinking about social justice
concerns in all contexts (p. 216). This directly challenges what
Duarte (2001) called “models of learning that leave no room for
‘inner speech,’ and, thus, appear to ‘infantilize’ students by
requiring them to constantly ‘speak their minds’” (p. 207). Using
what Duarte (2001) called a pedagogy of contemplation, the
pedagogue might “echo the voice of the Delphic Oracle and exhort
students to ‘stop and think’ in order to take up the most challenging yet pressing of learning assignments: know thyself ” (p. 216).
The social justice project in classroom spaces then becomes one of
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contemplative thinking about students’ prejudices and hatred
without the threat of aggression present in public discourse,
understanding that the “activity of thinking [as opposed to public
debating] is among the conditions that make [people] abstain from
evil doing or even actually ‘condition’ them against it” (Duarte,
2001, p. 220).
This thinking cannot occur in “public,” or specifically around
others. As Duarte (2001) went on to say, “The need to withdraw
from the company of others and, thereby, to ‘stop and think’ is . . .
an integral part of the human condition” (p. 202). To conclude this
section, I would reiterate that the teacher that uses agonism ought
to potentially consider two key ideas. First, that the use of this
public discourse style ought to be used in simulation only, and
second, there should be the opportunity to “clear some discursive
space for the articulation of alternative pedagogical models” that
give space for reflective thinking on the political simulation
(p. 207).

Transformation and Oppression
The next point that I explore is that of the truth of oppression. Lo
(2017) certainly demonstrated that there is pedagogical value in
agonism, and I see this as principally preparing students for the
public world, that they might not withdraw from the world of
political discourse. Lo, however, suggested that agonistic deliberation can “transform” students, and it is this notion that I trouble in
this section. Lo elaborated about this transformative understanding by suggesting that:
Instead of having students engage in political tolerance, which sets
aside differences temporarily to logically consider the rights available
to everyone, agonism asks students to transform their ideas about the
world. Instead of just putting their difference on hold for the sake of
human rights, the agonistic process encourages students to challenge
their own positionalities (as well as one another’s positions) in the
conflict. (p. 6)

In the midst of what Shapiro (2006) called “a culture that emphasizes a ‘cool insensitivity’ to the feelings of others,” students might
be transformed through a method of agnostic deliberation (p. 161).
The concern here is that in this agonistic model, even if much
might be learned about respecting the rules of engagement and
public dignity, it seems difficult to imagine agonistic discourse
transforming someone. A part of the problem here comes from
the fact that the teacher seems to be more facilitator or midwife
of the process and therefore not actively exposing students to
truths about privilege and oppression. Certainly a topic might
present opportunities to engage around issues of social justice, but
it doesn’t seem as though this is guaranteed to occur. As Bettez,
Black, Conley, and Ezzell (2008) wrote in “Social Justice Activist
Teaching in the University Classroom,” “Education that does not
address issues of privilege and oppression is not transformative
education . . . [and] avoiding issues of power and inequality allows
students to continue to believe prevalent myths” (p. 283).
While I understand that an agonistic deliberative model is
conceived to give power to the marginalized and develop transformation, it seems that without some sense of value placed on
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issues of power, privilege, oppression, and inequality, a model that
lets students get there from agonistic deliberation seems almost an
attempt by the teacher to develop detachment, or even neutrality.
On the one hand, Lo (2017) wrote that traditional deliberative
models might leave the marginalized with “feelings of disempowerment [that] may be entrenched further by a deliberative
framework that hopes to leave students with a ‘feel good’ or
‘everyone is a winner’ perception” (p. 5). I see how traditional
deliberative models might do this, but I am unsure that the
agonistic model is demonstrably different in this regard. With this
in mind, I cite Lo again, this time speaking about agonistic
deliberation: “Agonistic deliberation, on the other hand, would
take great care to validate students’ perspectives no matter how
bizarre, jarring, or irrational they may seem” (p. 7). A problem
arising here is that validating students’ perspectives, no matter how
bizarre, seems very similar to the “everybody is a winner” way of
thinking. I suspect that Lo saw agonistic deliberation as more
specifically validating marginalized students’ perspectives, but still
this seems to be leaving the situation value free. Were these
agonistic deliberations coupled with explicit discussions of power,
privilege, oppression, and inequality then we might be able to
realize Macedo’s (1994) vison that “we must first read the
world—the cultural, social, and political practices that constitute
it—before we can make sense of the word level description of
reality” (p. 27). Specifically, without a working understanding of
these kinds of concepts, the experiences of marginal communities
might continue to seem distant, vague, and unintelligible, even in
the midst of agonistic deliberation.
Finally, in this section, I want to critically consider the very
notion of transformation. While it seems a bit of a paradox, the
experience of education might be transformative yet becomes
more difficult when educational models seek to transform. When
describing an emancipatory teaching experience in his book The
Ignorant Schoolmaster, philosopher Jacques Rancière (1991)
pointed out that the teacher “had transmitted nothing. He had not
used any method. The method was purely the student’s” (p. 14). In
contrast, Lo (2017) made clear in this article that there is a goal
in mind for this agonistic deliberation and that the techniques
explored are instruments for achieving “future
transformation—transformation of how everyone in the class
perceives their realities” (p. 7). To trouble this idea, I turn to
philosopher Gert Biesta (2014), who, in The Beautiful Risk of
Education, pointed out that “transformation can never be driven
from the perspective of the self and its desires, but always requires
engagement with what or who is other” (p. 3). Could agonistic
deliberation allow for the possibility of transformation by the
Other? Certainly, but I think that transformation involves always a
risk, and positioning transformation as something that can be
accomplished through a model seeks to eliminate the risk inherent
in the transformative pedagogical event.

Creating Conditions for Transformation
How can we provide the conditions for the kind of transformative
experience agonistic deliberation has the potential of being? I pose
this question because there are some tacit assumptions that need
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unpacking to understand how groundwork might be set to make
this agonism function. Lo (2017) wrote, quoting Mouffe:
Agonism anticipates to face and struggle with a dissimilar adversary.
This distinction is important because “an adversary is a legitimate
enemy, an enemy with whom we have in common a shared adhesion
to the ethico-political principles of democracy.” (p. 6)

I highlight this passage because I wonder if the conditions are
typically set to make this happen. I certainly agree that it is possible
to set the conditions for a shared adhesion to these principles, but
also I argue that it cannot never be assumed as a given. This is
particularly true in light of the fact that we, as a culture, have
difficulty even developing a clear definition of freedom (Greene,
1988, p. 19). Given the structural disconnect between signs like
freedom and their significations, I turn to back to the philosopher
Gert Biesta (2014), who argued that “the teacher not only needs to
give the learner the truth, but also needs to give the learner ‘the
condition of recognizing it as truth’” (p. 50 Quoting Kierkegaard).
Biesta, in The Beautiful Risk of Education, outlined an approach
whereby there is a focus on the conditions-that-might-lead-to as
opposed to a formula-for-the-development-of. Biesta (2014)
referred to this distinction as “weak” versus “strong” education
(p. 11). In this conceptualization, the teacher still oversees an act of
creation, or “an act of bringing something new into the word,
something that did not exist before” (Biesta, 2014, p. 11). The
difference is that in the weak form of creation, the focus is on
the conditions that allow for creation; by extension then, we
might think of developing a weak deliberation as setting the
conditions that allow for a democratic transformation during
agonistic deliberation. Applying aspects of Biesta’s weakness in
education to deliberative models would see agonistic models
allowing for the very risk that might actually result in transformative learning experiences, without envisioning a specific end result.
In short, we cannot simulate encounters with the Other that
produce transformative experiences; rather, we might envision
creating spaces that empower the marginalized Other to share
their experiences without expecting a particular result.

Conclusion: Deliberation without Oppression
In a final point, I want to leave a caution about existential reality in
the process of agonism. Lo’s (2017) notion of validating the
narratives of marginal groups is extremely powerful, and I am in
total agreement that “rather than providing only rational evidence
to logically back up their assertions, students can provide anecdotal stories or experiences that give rise to their thinking” (p. 8).
This resonates because it really does speak to the classic feminist
statement that the personal becomes political. However, there is a
cautionary point here, and I think that it comes from the flip side of
this argument. Everything that is allowed for with marginal groups
will become fair game for those with oppressive viewpoints, and
this is somewhat alarming, as I have witnessed firsthand in my
classrooms that students often have a great deal of emotionally
charged and anecdotal evidence to justify racism, homophobia,
patriarchy, and other troubling ideas. It is true that “peoples’ identification with a particular point of view is, first, a matter of our
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emotional connections to it” and that “one must start by acknowledging that one’s own perspective is a story that might occlude,
distort, or silence the experience of the other” (Shapiro, 2006,
pp. 160–161). If we take these to be true, then agonistic deliberation
perhaps risks the further marginalization of certain groups by
legitimizing racist, sexist, and other bigoted points of view. This is
why, when developing conditions for the agonistic deliberative
event, it is critical to allow for risk and therefore leave the project
pen but also to create conditions that at least minimize the
likelihood of aggressions against marginalized and vulnerable
populations. Yes, agonistic deliberative models of pedagogy are
needed to strengthen democratic debate, but care must be taken to
execute a weaker model of deliberation: one that sets the conditions for transformative education, does not act as an instrument
for it, and is at its core antioppressive.
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